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POST WORLD WAR II CRUDE OIL PRICES:

COLLUSIVE OR COMPETITIVE PRICING

Kern 0. Kymn and Walter P. Page
Department of Economics, West Virginia University
Morgantown, West Virginia

Abstract
The study presents a crude oil market model explaining the trend in crude oil
prices, 1945-1976. The competitiveness of the market is assessed in terms of
this model.
1.

INTRODUCTION
world crude oil market. Our model, of course,
does not explain the short-run fluctuations in
crude prices associated with political events
or the vagaries of nature, but it will serve to
focus on the economically relevant variables in
the explanation of price trends.

There is no shortage of petroleum industry
studies covering the period since World War II.
The crude petroleum market has been subject to
periodic "shocks", largely associated with
political decision making by supplying or
purchasing nation states and the discovery of
new fields in the Middle East and Africa.
Because this is the case, researchers have been
hard pressed to provide economic models of the
crude oil sector which satisfactorily explain
the course of crude oil prices. One need only
examine the detailed and sophisticated analysis
found in what is probably the definitive work on
the world petroleum market, M. Adelman The World
Petroleum Market, to gain an appreciation of the
industry complexity over this period. There
exists ample opportunity for disagreement
concerning the competitiveness of the crude oil
market, some arguing the market has been
essentially competitive while others stress
collusion.

Our paper is divided into the following sections;
(2) A Brief Review of Crude Oil Prices Since
World War II, (3) Characteristics of the Foreign
Crude Oil Industry, (4) An Economic Model of the
Foreign Crude Oil Markets, (5) Empirical Evidence
Supporting Competitive Pricing.
2. A REVIEW OF CRUDE OIL PRICES
SINCE WORLD WAR II*
There exist, of course, not one but many crude
oil prices, each associated with different
refining needs, different transportation costs,
differences in domestic final goods prices where
petroleum is a significant input, etc. Such
differences explain the divergence in the level
and/or the rates of change of prices in given
markets. An explanation of these differences is
beyond the scope of this paper. We are
interested in examining the general trend in
crude oil price behavior since World War II and
will neglect the pecularities in pricing
behavior found in individual markets. Because of

What we propose to do in this paper is to
isolate those economically important aspects of
crude petroleum markets which suggest to us an
appropriate model for the explanation of general
price trends in crude oil markets. We also
examine the relevant industry studies which
provide statistical measures concerning
tne degree of competitiveness in the

*This section of the paper leans heavily on the detailed treatment found in
N.H. Jacoby, Multinational Oil, and M. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market.

524

the 1957 U.S. "voluntary" import quotas, the
mandatory quotas of 1959 and the actions of
commissions such as the Texas Railroad Commission,
U.S. crude oil prices over the period do not
necessarily reflect the trend in international
crude prices. Consequently we focus on the price
behavior associated with the foreign crude oil
market.

prices may be viewed as reflecting market prices.
Posted prices for Ras Tanura, for instance, are
constant throughout the 1960s as are those of
leading crude oils in Kuwait and Arabia in general.
The downward trend in market prices during the
1960s is reflected in the average annual prices
of petroleum products imported into leading
markets during the decade of the 1960s. While
there again exists variation in the crude price
experience among the nations of Germany, France,
U.K., Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, the
average price in 1972 was substantially lower in
than it had been two decades earlier in 1953.
Furthermore, this fails to take into account the
rise in the general price level in Western Europe
since approximately 1965. The real price of crude
had fallen substantially more than money price
data would reflect, although variations in
national inflation rates do not permit a detailed
comparison at this time. One study (see 1, page
183) calculates a "derived" crude oil price or a
"computed Persian Gulf realized price" which shows
the Gulf price at $1.50 per barrel in 1960 and
$1.23 in 1967 with a low of $1.17 in 1965. The
corresponding increase in the general price level
(1960 equals 100) was 111 in 1967. The yields a
real price in 1967 of $1.10 per barrel. Similar
sharp declines in money and real prices were
realized in other major crude markets. There
exists no disagreement but what the general trend
in crude prices over the period of the 1960s was
sharply downward. Variations in the structure of
prices or rates of change reflect differences in the
quality of crude, location and length of contract,
and differences in domestic price levels for those
products extensively utilizing crude or refined
oil as an input.

U.S. and Caribbean supplies of crude prior to
World War II constituted the primary sources of
crude oil to world markets. Eastern oil prices
were essentially tied to U.S. crude delivered
prices in foreign markets. This "Gulf-Plus"
pricing structure ceased to be effective by the
later 1940s due to the significant increase in
Middle East crude production. The 1948 and 1949
cuts in Middle East crude prices effectively
broke the cost-plus-transportation price system
that had prevailed prior to World War II. While
quoted prices of West Texas 35° and Oficina 35°
were constant at approximately $2.60 between
1948 and roughly 1952, Arabian 34° and Kuwait 31°
declined from approximately $2.00 to $1.70 in the
case of Arabian and from approximately $1.80 to
$1.65 for Kuwait by 1950. Port-of-origin prices
for Saudi Arabia (Ras Tanura ) declined, for
instance, from $2.18 in January 1948 to a low of
$1.71 in 1950.
Sharp increases in world demand for crude
together with several essentially political
events - the Korean conflict, Iranian oil
nationalization, the Suez Canal crisis, etc. all tended to restrict civilian supplies of crude,
leading to a sellers' market and rising prices
until approximately 1957. Posted port-of-origin
prices for Saudi Arabia (Ras Tanura) rose, for
example, from a low of $1.71 in 1950 to a high in
1957 of $2.08. Despite some oil company price
chiseling on sales, there were two sharp rounds of
price increases largely stimulated by the American
price increases of 1953 and 1957. The trend of
quoted prices for leading crude oils at port-oforigin - West Texas 35°, Oficina 35°, Arabian 34°
and Kuwait 31° - all reflect rising prices with
discrete price jumps centered on 1953 and 1957.
The reopening of the Suez, substantial increases
in the number of producing firms at all levels
in the petroleum industry, and the U.S. import
quota's, substantially increased the supplies of
crude to non-U.S. buyers and led to a falling
price level for crude throughout most of the
sixties.

It has been pointed out that "Just as World War II
formed a watershed in the history of the world oil
industry, so will historians look back on the early
1970s as another watershed, separating a vanished
age of cheap energy and private oil enterprise
from a new age of expensive energy and governmental
domination of oil pricing and production decisions.
For good or evil, political considerations have
become dominant in both exporting and importing
countries." (6, pg. 258) This statement
captures, at least for the short-run, the flavor
of the world crude markets since the late 1960s or
early 1970s. It probably represents a significant
overstatement, neglecting the supply responses
already underway outside the Middle East and
Africa. As present prices of crude, previously
marginal deposits of fossil fuel have come into
use, new technologies are being developed for
liquifaction or gasification of coal, intensive
exploration efforts are underway in the North Seas
and elsewhere, etc. Nevertheless, the statement
points to the fact that crude oil pricing since
the late 1960s increasingly reflects the cartel
decisions associated with OPEC and OAPEC nations.
As is well known, the cartel decisions resulted in
sharp price increases for crude oil. The TehranTripoli Agreements of 1971 attested to the
strength of the Cartel and the behavior of
consuming countries in "ratifying" the price
behavior has only strengthened the Cartel.

The period beginning approximately with 1957 and
ending in the late 1960s witnessed rapidly
declining money and real prices for crude oil.
The Middle East and North African crude oil
prices dominated world crude prices in this
period. Events between 1957 and roughly 1959 led
to the abandoment of "posted" prices as any
measure of market prices and the reduction in
market prices throughout the 1960s stimulated the
formation of OPEC. Posted prices since roughly
1960 serye only as an indicator of the hase for
calculation of per-barrel taxes on production.
1957, then, is roughly the last year when posted
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tration ratios at all levels in the petroleum in
dustry.

Between 1971 and 1974 (January) the posted price
of Saudi Arabia (Ras Tanura) rose from $2.29 to
$11.65 with all Middle East and African oil
reflecting similar increases. Clearly an
economic model explaining the price hehayiof qnd
competitiveness of the crude oil market, 19451971, will not be an adequate description of
price formation or competitiveness since 1971.
3.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOREIGN
CRUDE OIL MARKET

In this section we attempt to document the changes
in the structure and size of the foreign crude oil
market since WWII which are essential to our argu
ment later. No attempt is made to provide a
detailed statement concerning the many changes in
organization and structure of the industry.*
Between 1948 and 1972 crude oil production in the
foreign non-Communist world rose tenfold from 3.1
million barrels per day to 31 million barrels per
day, an average annual compound growth rate of
10%. The largest gains in foreign output were in
Venezuela, the Middle East, North Africa and
Indonesia, the Middle East growth in production
accounting for approximately 51% of the total
change in non-Communist world output. The
Middle East alone increased its share of total
world crude oil production (including Communist
world output) from 29.8% in 1948 to 45.3% in 1972.
Clearly in the period from 1948 to 1972 the
enormous growth in output of crude is concentrated
in the members of OPEC with OAPEC dominating that
growth.
The tenfold increase in non-Communist world out
put was accompanied by a surge of entry into the
petroleum industry at all levels: concession
rights, production facilities, refining and tanker
operations, and marketing. Between 1953 and 1972
more than 300 private companies and 50 governmentowned companies entered the foreign oil industry
or significantly expanded their participation in
that industry. Entry led to substantial changes
in the concentration of the foreign oil industry
between, say, 1953 and 1972. Comparing the
"seven largest" companies with "all others", in
concession areas the seven largest held 64% and
"all others" 36% of the area in 1953 while in 1972
the respective percentages were 24 and 76. In
production, 1953 figures show the seven largest
producing 87% of total output and all other 13%,
in 1972 all others produced 29% and the seven
largest 71%. In terms of average annual compound
growth rates of proven reserves between 1953 and
1972, the seven largest companies grew at an
average annual rate of 9% while "all others" grew
at 19%. In average daily production the seven
largest had a 9% average annual rate while all
others had a 15% rate. Not only were there large
increases in the number of firms over this period,
there were very substantial shifts in the concen

Gross investment in various stages of the petro
leum industry increased at a faster rate than did
production, reserves, refining capacity or
consumption. Investment in fixed assets rose at
approximately 12% per year, 1948-72. Gross invest
ment in fixed assets, foreign non-Communist world
petroleum industry, rose from approximately $6.9
billion to $134.5 million. Investment in produc
tion facilities alone rose from $2,410 million to
$15,810 million between 1946 and 1961 and to
$32,220 million by 1972.
The high rates of postwar investment led to con
siderable surplus capacity by the late 1950s or
early 1960s. In large measure this was due to
the new fields discovered and developed in the
Middle East and Africa. While estimates vary, it
has been suggested that in 1960 there existed
about 42% excess capacity in the non-Communist
world and by 1961 the figure rose to 50%. The
surplus condition persisted throughout the decade
of the 1960s. Beginning in roughly 1970, U.S.,
Canadian, and Venezuelian production began to
reach capacity limits. Simultaneously there were
sharp increases in the demand for crude. Known
large reserves in the Middle East and Africa
together with the rapidly rising demand for oil
were propitious conditions for the OPEC nations
in the early 1970s.
Since World War II foreign government "rents"
charged for use of their resources - royalties
and income tax rates - have been substantially
increased. Where income taxes had not existed
prior to WW II, they were implemented and the
rates rose throughout the period. Royalty pay
ments, which were often low and calculated on a
per barrel basis early in the period, went to a
percentage of posted prices and the rates were
regularly increased. Some idea of this shift may
be gained from the following illustrations;
Kuwait (AOC) had no royalty or income tax in 1948,
but by 1972 were charging 20% expenses royalty
plus 45% tax or a 62% tax of net profits, which
ever is greater; Venezuela in 1948 extracted
royalties of 16 2/3% of calculated price (U.S.
Gulf Coast prices) and a minimum of 50% income
tax (net income), but by 1972 received 16 2/3%
of agreed commercial value based on Texas posted
prices and 60% of net income; Saudi Arabia
(ARAMCO) received royalties of four shillings gold
per ton for onshore production and exempted
companies for income tax in 1948, while by 1972
they received 12 1/2% of post price and a 55%
net profits income tax; Iran, Iraq and Kuwait
followed roughly the same experience as that of
Saudi Arabia. Over the entire period, the "rent"
increases where greatest, of course, in those
areas where proved reserves were the greatest; the
Middle East and Africa.

*Detailed discussion may be found in 1, 2 for the foreign crude oil market
and in 5 for the U.S.
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For simplicity, assume all OPEC producers use a
fixed tax plus royalty on crude oil. This would
cause a shift of the supply curve from S to S*" in
Part A of Figure I and price would rise to Pt and
quantity fall to Q^. From the resource owner's
point of view, this leaves a potential income from
the tax and royalty amounting, at a maximum, to KM
per barrel sold. Of that amount, KL per barrel
(the area PtKLPc which equals EFGH in Part B)
could be collected from the importing countries
due to the higher price of oil, while LM per barrel
(the area PCLMA) could potentially be collected
from the producing firms. It is this motivation the possibility of rising "rents" to the exhausti
ble resource - together with the fact that OPEC
nations generally lacked their own production and
distribution system, that accounts for the willing
ness to see new non-affiliated companies enter the
exploration and production stages in the crude oil
market and to permit significant increases in the
concession areas to both affiliated and non-affiliated companies.

The principal features of the foreign crude oil
market since WW II which we feel are important
to economic modelling are the following: The
rapid shift in known reserves and crude oil pro
duction away from the U.S., Canada, and Latin
America and toward the Middle East and Africa;
The growth of gross investment and surplus
capacity during the 1950s and 1960s, particularly
in production and exploration in the "new" areas;
The rapidly rising "rents" in those producing
regions where known reserves and production were
increasingly concentrated; And the lack of pro
ducing, marketing and shipping facilities on the
part of the nation states where reserves and
production were concentrated. We will focus on
these elements in an effort to explain the
course of crude oil prices over the period since
WW II and to assess the relative competitiveness
of the crude oil market.
4.

AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF FOREIGN
CRUDE OIL MARKETS, 1945-1976

The pre-World War II oil market was dominated by
a few large multinational producers, a system of
Gulf-plus pricing, and entry into the industry
was very difficult and costly. In short, industry
pricing policy perhaps reflected cartel conditions
or price-leadership conditions. So we begin the
analysis with a few multinational firms essentially
dominating the crude oil markets in the World War
II period.
In Figure I, Part A, the curve labelled S=EMC.
represents the sum of the marginal costs of tfte
multi-national producers coming out of World War
II. In part B, S^ represents the domestic supply
of crude in those countries importing from what
would later become the OPEC members. Again in
Part B, Dt is the total demand on the part of
importing countries. D , then, is the derived
net import demand for crude oil from OPEC members.
The curve Dw in Part A, is the world demand for
OPEC members' crude oil and is equal to Dp, from
Part B of the same figure. A beginning equili
brium price, then, would be Pc with Q purchased
from OPEC members. By construction, f*cC would be
equal to AB in Part B and PCA would be consumed
from domestic sources of crude.
We wish to use this figure to illustrate the
economic effects of three important characteris
tics of the crude oil market over the period
until the late 1960s. The addition of a large
number of new exploratory and producing firms,
the impact of new or rising "rents" on an ex
haustible resources and the reduction of barriers
to entry into the crude oil market.

To see the potential gains to owners of the
resource from large scale entry, assume m-k firms
enter the industry shifting the supply curve S in
Part A to S' when S=?MC. and m is obviously greater
than k. This would Strive price down from P to P '
and expand output from Q to Q '. But the 6ax
wguld again shift S' up and to the left to, say,
S ', resulting in a final equilibrium price of Pt'
with Qt' quantity sold. Looking at Part B, at the
price Pc' domestic production on the part of im
porting countries would fall off sharply and imports
increase very substantially. In terms of revenues
from the tax, OPEC producing nations would collect
QR per barrel from the importing countries in the
form of the higher price (relative to Pc') and RX
per barrel from the producing firms for a total
potential gain of Pt'QXB. So long as QX is greater
than KM, tax and royalty receipts will be larger
following entry than under the prior circumstances
where S was the supply curve. Clearly there exists
a strong motivation for those owning the resources
to encourage exploration on concession areas and
to .augment the production of crude.* It was
precisely the possibility of expanding the market
area for Middle East and African crude, and the
resulting gains in revenue, that led to the sharp
price reduction on Middle East crude in 1948 and
1949. In terms of our figure, St represents the
after-tax supply curve of multinational firms.
Entry of non-affiliated firms together with ex
pansion in Middle East production by multinationals,
substantially increased supply to some point
right of S. The after-tax supply curve would lie
to the right of S and f.o.b. prices would fall.
By 1949 the f.o.b. price for Persian Gulf was low

*We are focusing on the OPEC nations as they will play the major role in the
decades of the 1950s and 1960s. The argument would not suffer if we included
U.S. exports of crude. It would only cause a shift of the Sd curve and a
different set of beginning prices.
*We abstract from considerations of the optimal time path of extraction and
assume the needs for real income in these areas produced a strong bias toward
present as against future income-a very high rate of preference.
527

enough for Persian crude to enter the U.S. East
Coast markets.
The period 1950-59 was one of rising prices. As
one researcher has said; "As a result of oligo
poly plus government block to competition plus
price-raising regulation in the United States,
supply was held as close as possible to antici
pated consumption. If demand outran supply,
prices were allowed to react upward; whereupon
nobody sold at less than the new price. This
ratchet effect needed no intercompany communica
tion (which may have occurred, but we do not '
know). It did require a good understanding of
what was possible." (6, pg. 158) We pointed out
in section 2 some additional arguments shedding
light on why the competitive process begun in
1948 and 1949 did not persist in the 1950s. We
believe that in general the behavior of prices in
this period can only be explained in terms of
non-market forces - prorationing in the U.S.
import controls in the U.S., for approximately
a decade, possibly decisions in the Persian Gulf
to restrict output and concentrate on Eastern
refineries where prices were substantially higher
than in the West, etc. The juxtaposition in time
of all these events and policies defies any con
sistent theoretical explanation. The motivation,
however, which led to declining prices for Persian
Gulf crude - the opportunity to increase rents on
the exhaustible resource - certainly persisted
and was in large measure responsible for the
period of falling prices after 1957.
The period from roughly 1957 to the late 1960s
or early 1970s witnessed sharp increases in pro
duction and the number of firms producing crude.
Events were largely centered in the Middle East
and North Africa. There were continuing increases
in taxes and royalties on crude oil production
and very substantial shifts in the supply of crude.
In terms of our Figure I, the shifts in supply
certainly resulted in declining prices as new
companies entered production and established
multinationals expanded their Middle East and
African operations. The effect on price is
clear and the gains in revenues to the resource
owners in the affected region have already been
discussed above. Without the integrated facilities
necessary for domestically owned and operated
production, refining, transporting, and marketing
crude or refined products, "rents" to ownership
of the resouce could only he garnered through
increased output and rising tax and royalty rates.
It is our opinion that this period represents a
continuation of the competitive market forces
seen in the price declines of 1948 and 1949. Our
formulation of the market model in Figure I is
consistent with the price decline over this period.
Of more importance, it provides the rational or
motivation on the part of resource owners for
easing entry into the crude oil market and sub
stantially increasing crude oil output.
As we suggested in section 2 above, the
1970s represented a significant turning
the crude oil market. The market power
effectiveness of OPEC characterizes the

early
point in
and
period
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from roughly 1971 to the present. We believe the
appropriate crude oil economic model since 1971
is that of a cartel. Simply stated, a cartel is
an "...alliance of competing firms such that the
members retain their separate identities and
separate control over their policies subject to
the terms of the cartel agreement." (8, pg. 179)
The fundamental condition remains, however, that
supplying nations in the Middle East and Africa
still generally rely on others for the marketing,
etc., of crude oil. It has been observed by the
board chairman of British Petroleum that multi
national oil companies have become the "tax
collecting agency" of the producing nations. Some
haye suggested that current OPEC prices have
already taken nearly all the profits from oil
production (except the minimum return on invest
ment) and that prices are approaching the optimal
monopoly or cartel level (see 2).
The cartel pricing decision and the returns to
the cartel are analyzed in Figure II. As in
Figure I, Dt is total demand for OPEC crude oil,
is domestic supply in importing countries and
Dm the derived demand for imports. S, in part A,
now represents the supply function for all pro
ducers under control of the cartel. Dw is world
demand for OPEC crude and is equal to Dm from
Part B. The maximum cartel profit is found where
MR equals Sm C^. Price would be set at Pr. P^
and Qc wouid have been the competitive values.
With price at Pr, sales are Qt. At the competi
tive price Pc, JK is imported and PCJ produced
domestically. At Pr, LM is imported and PrE is
the domestic supply. At the cartel price, then,
importing nations pay RSZU to producers because
of the higher price (which equals LMNQ in part B.)
Hence UZWV represents the profits garnered from
multinationals. Again, it is the effort on the
part of the cartel to garner the "rents" from
ownership of the exhaustible resource which ex
plains the pattern of behavior.
5.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
COMPETITIVE PRICING

There has been much discussion concerning the
competitiveness of crude oil markets. One view
asserts collusive or cartel pricing throughout
the post World War II period (for a recent state
ment see 4), another stresses the influence of
competitive markets on price behavior over sub
periods while focusing on collusive behavior and
government regulation in the remaining periods
(see 2) while still others stress the essentially
competitive nature of the foreign crude oil market
oyer the entire period (see 6). Despite the period
of rising prices between 1950 and 1957, it is our
belief that the foreign crude oil market was
increasingly competitive throughout the entire
period.
Some evidence in support of our position was pre
sented in section 3 of this paper, particularly
the data concerning entry into the petroleum
industry at all levels. To assess the competi
tiveness of a market, however, requires the

calculation of some standard statistical
measures or indices of competitiveness. A
commonly used measure of concentration is the
"degree of concentration" or the percent of the
market occupied by the first 4 and the first 8
firms. The ranks are very high, high, moderately
high, moderately low and low. For manufacturing
very high would be 90% or more of the market
occupied by the first 8 firms, high 85-90%,
moderately high 70-85%, moderately low 45-70% and
low under 45%. On that standard, the period 1953
to 1972 had the following changes; in exploration
concessions from moderately high to low; from
high or very high to moderate in sales of
petroleum, ownership of crude oil production and
proven reserves; moderately high to moderately
low in ownership of refining capacity; and from
low to very low in ownership of tanker capacity.
Particularly important for an assessment of the
crude oil market is the concentration of
concessions as a measure of the extensiveness of
the search for oil. In 1948 approximately 48
companies other than the seven largest held
concessions over an area of approximately one
million square miles. The largest seven had
1.72 million square miles. By 1972 over 330
firms other than the top seven had foreign
exploration rights. The total estimated
concession area was 9.3 million square miles and
the share of the seven largest had fallen from
64 to 28 percent (6, ch.9).

period 1945-1971.
6.
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Rate of earnings is a frequently used measure of
competitiveness. That is, a persistently high
rate of return relative to returns in similar
risk situations often indicates non-competitive
market behavior. The rate of earnings on U.S.
direct invement in the foreign petroleum industry
was much higher than the earnings in foreign
manufacturing, mining and smelting or other
industries from 1955 until approximately 1959.
Throughout this period, however, the rate of
earnings was continually falling and by the early
1960s it was approximately equal to the returns
in manufacturing, mining and smelting and other
industries. Entry into the industry in response
to the high rate of earnings reduced, as we know,
crude oil prices as well as the rate of earnings.
This market behavior is certainly consistent with
competitiveness.
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The information presented in sections 3 and 4
above supports the competitiveness of the market.
Not only was entry increasingly easy since the
mid 1950s, there were very large increases in
the number of firms and in the new firm's market
shares. The trend in crude oil prices excepting the 1950-57 period and the period since
1971 - certainly reflects the competitive
behavior of the market and our analysis in
section 4 isolates the forces stimulating
competitiveness and the price decline.
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In brief, we believe the standard statistical
measures of competitiveness as well as our own
analysis of the foreign crude petroleum market,
provide strong support for the conclusion that
the market was increasingly competitive over the
529

P3
C
J

World Demand and Supply (OPEC Crude
Petroleum Market)

FIGURE I
I

Importing Countries from OPEC Members

LO

P5

P
P
m
h

W

S
H
W
t-1

Pm

530

P4
V

World Demand and Supply (OPEC Crude
Petroleum Market)

FIGURE II
o

H

U

H

Pm

t-1

W

§
H
W
P
m

531

Importing Countries from OPEC Members

